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The Faculty of Law and the Program on Nonprofit Corporations jointly hosted the Inaugural WA Lee Equity 
Lecture.  The Annual Lecture Series was launched by The Honourable Mr Paul de Jersey AC, Chief Justice 
of Queensland. 
 
 
Mr WA (Tony) Lee 
 
Mr Lee began his professional life as a solicitor in West Wales then subsequently worked for MH Treasury 
in London, before taking up a lectureship in law at the University of Queensland in 1965.  There he taught 
Equity and Succession until 1990.  He was closely involved in work of the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission preparatory to the passage of the Trusts Act 1973 and the Succession Act 1981.  He is author 
of A Manual of Queensland Succession Law  and co-author, with Emeritus Professor HAJ Ford of the 
University of Melbourne of Principles of the Law of Trusts.  In 1988, he was elected to a Visiting Fellowship 
at Wolfson College, Cambridge.  He has been a visiting professor at the Bond University, the University of 
Western Australia and the Queensland Institute of Technology.  He was a Commissioner for Law Reform in 
Queensland from 1990 to 1996.  In retirement he spends a great deal of time updating his work on trustee 
law. 
 
 
Partners in the Inaugural WA Lee Equity Lecture 
 
The Queensland Community Foundation (QCF) in its current form was established in 1997 under the 
trusteeship of the Public Trustee of Queensland. Chaired by Mike Ahern, QCF is a public charitable trust 
which provides a permanent funding source for charity and a cost effective, flexible and financially secure 
mechanism for people or organisations wishing to become involved in philanthropy. 
 
Queensland Law Society and Proctor – The Queensland Law Society is the professional organisation for 
some 4,900 solicitors admitted in Queensland.  It is incorporated under The Queensland Law Society Act 
1952.  The Society is a statutory body funded mainly from membership fees. Services to members include 
Proctor, continuing education, a referral service for the public, the issue of practising certificates, 
maintaining records, researching and making submissions to government. 
 
The Bar Association of Queensland was established in 1903 as the professional body representing the 
interests of the members of the Bar in practice in Queensland.  The Bar Association's main concern is for 
the promotion of the cause of justice and maintenance of the high professional standards of the Bar.  
Membership, in various categories, is available to all persons who are admitted as Barristers of the 
Supreme Court of Queensland.  
 
LBC Information Services – As part of Australian legal publishing for over 100 years, LBC Information 
Services has established itself as a leader in both its written and electronic publications.  Moving into the 
new millennium with a range of information tools that builds on its strength and history, LBC is committed to 
ensure its clients gain maximum advantage from new technologies whilst continuing to publish products 
from its entire range in all formats. 
 
Domaine Chandon Australia – The philosophy at Domaine Chandon has always been to produce the 
best quality sparkling wine following the traditional methods of Moët & Chandon whilst respecting the 
flavours of Australian grapes.  Chandon Brut, the first non-vintage release, is a wine aged on yeast lees for 
18 months to develop classic flavours of white peach, honey and roasted nuts. 
 
QUT Faculty of Business – The Faculty hosts the Program on Nonprofit Corporations that was 
established in 1991 at QUT and encourages multi disciplinary research on the nonprofit sector. It has a 
reputation for legal and policy research involving nonprofit law, accounting, management and social policy. 
 
QUT Faculty of Law – The QUT Faculty of Law was established in 1977 at the request of the legal 
profession.  Since then it has established itself as an eminent provider of legal education in Australia 
through undergraduate and postgraduate courses and the first practical legal training course in 
Queensland. 
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Introduction:  The new regime for the investment of trust funds 
 
Within the last five years all Australian jurisdictions, following a New Zealand lead, have abolished the 
old statutory list of authorised trustee investments and have given trustees an unlimited investment 
power: Australian Capital Territory (Trustee Amendment Act No 28 of 1999); New South Wales 
(Trustee Amendment (Discretionary Investments) Act No 102 of 1997); the Northern Territory  
(Trustee Amendment (No 2) Act No 60 of 1995); Queensland (Trustee (Investments) Amendment Act 
No 69 of 1999); South Australia (Trustee (Investment Powers) Act of 1995); Tasmania: Trustee 
Amendment (Investment Powers) Act 1997; Victoria: Trustee and Trustee Companies (Amendment) 
Act 1995 (No 104/1995); and Western Australia: Trustees Amendment Act 1997; New Zealand 
Trustee Amendment Act 1988, No 119. 
 
The new legislation provides that: 
 
“A trustee may, unless expressly prohibited by the instrument creating the trust - 
(a) invest trust funds in any form of investment; and 
(b) at any time, vary an investment.” 
 
In New Zealand the wording of (a) is “in any property”. 
 
There is also a specific power enabling trustees to purchase a dwelling house as a residence for a 
beneficiary: (ACT s14E; NSW s14DA; NT s10A Qld s28; Tas s5; Vic s11; WA s4). 
 
As well as liberating trustees with respect to their investment powers the legislation places significant 
constraints upon them.  
 
 
The prudent person test 
 
The legislation imposes a standard of conduct on trustees when investing in the following terms. 
 
“(1) Subject to the instrument creating the trust, a trustee must, in exercising a power of 
investment – 
 
(a) if the trustee’s profession, business or employment is or includes acting as a trustee or 
investing money on behalf of other persons, exercise the care, diligence and skill that a 
prudent person engaged in that profession, business or employment would exercise in 
managing the affairs of other persons; or 
 
(b) if the trustee is not engaged in such a profession, business or employment, exercise 
the care, diligence and skill that a prudent person would exercise in managing the 
affairs of other persons. 
 
(2) A trustee must exercise a power of investment in accordance with any provision of the 
instrument creating the trust that is binding on the trustee and requires the obtaining of any 
consent or approval with respect to trust investments. 
 
(3) Subject to the instrument creating the trust, a trustee must, at least once in each year, 
review the performance (individually and as a whole) of trust investments.” 
 
(ACT s14A; NSW s14A; NT s6; Qld s22; Tas s7; Vic s6; WA s18; NZ s13B.) 
 
The prudent person test has a long comparative jurisprudential history. 
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The prudent person test – a comparative background 
 
In the United States in 1830 in Harvard College v Amory 26 Mass (9 Pick) 446, the Massachusetts 
Court had to decide whether to follow the lead of the English courts and specify what investments 
trustees might and might not make, or whether to adopt a generalised approach.  The court ruled as 
follows: 
 
“All that can be required of a trustee to invest is that he shall conduct himself faithfully and 
exercise a sound discretion.  He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and 
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the 
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the 
probable safety of capital to be invested.” 
 
This classic statement is recognised as the first authoritative explication of the “prudent person” rule 
for the investment of trust funds. 
 
However as time went by the courts applied the rule in a manner that restricted its flexibility attracted 
criticism on a number of grounds.  It was said that the courts in the United States: 
 
a) focussed on individual assets rather than the trust portfolio as a whole – known as “anti-
netting”; 
 
b) confined its attention to voluntary trusts, and in particular trusts for successive beneficiaries, 
i.e. capital and income trusts and sidelined commercial trusts; 
 
c) failed to develop rules for the purpose of protecting the purchasing power of the trust fund;  
 
d) developed an artificial distinction between “prudent” and imprudent or “speculative” 
investments;  
 
e) allowed “safe”, that is list style, low risk investing without scrutiny; and  
 
f) prohibited the delegation of investment decisions. 
 
 
These criticisms only emerged after the phenomenon of inflation undermined the economic 
assumptions upon which financial theory had relied during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 
 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts, s 227 (1959) reflected and was in part responsible for the 
approach of the courts.  The section provided: 
 
“Investments Which a Trustee Can Properly Make 
 
In making investments of trust funds, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary (a) in 
the absence of provisions in the terms of the trust or of a statute otherwise providing, to 
make such investments and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his 
own property having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity 
of the income to be derived.”  
 
The focus of this formulation remained upon voluntary trusts requiring the separation of the capital and 
income accounts and the needs of beneficiaries having successive interests.  
Spurred on by the revelations of financial theorists of the post-war, inflationary era, American jurists 
secured adoption in 1992 of a new s 227 in Restatement of Trusts (Third) the purpose of which was a 
change of focus.  It provides that the trustee is under a duty: 
 
“to invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the 
purposes, terms, distribution requirements and other circumstances of the trust”. 
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Of this new formulation Edward C Halbach said in “Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement” 
[1992] 77 Iowa Law Review at 1155: 
 
“Accordingly, the prudent investor rule is intended to liberate expert trustees to pursue 
challenging, rewarding, non-traditional strategies when appropriate to a particular trust.  It 
is also designed to provide unsophisticated trustees with reasonably clear guidance to 
practical courses of investment that are readily identifiable, expectedly rewarding and 
broadly adaptable.” 
 
The distinction between the old “prudent person” and the new “prudent investor” is regarded as 
crucial. 
 
The developments in the United States form the background to the reforms that have taken place in 
Australia and New Zealand; the “prudent person” test of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, s 227 of 
1959 has been adopted and not the “prudent investor” test of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts of 
1992. 
 
The Australian and New Zealand legislation also imposes on trustees: 
 
(a) duty to exercise the powers of a trustee in the best interests of all present and future 
beneficiaries of the trust; 
 
(b) duty to invest trust funds in investments that are not speculative (or, in Western Australia, 
hazardous); 
 
(c) duty to act impartially towards beneficiaries and between different classes of beneficiaries; 
and 
 
(d) duty to take (in Queensland to obtain) advice. 
 
(ACT s14B; NSW s14B; NT s7; Qld s23; SA s8; Tas s9; Vic s7; WA s19; NZ s13F). 
 
These provisions, too, are redolent of earlier law.  They still evince concern with capital and income 
accounting in trusts for successive beneficial interests; and they maintain an arguably artificial 
distinction between prudent and speculative investments.  
 
 
Matters to which trustees must have regard in investing 
 
Despite the retention of the conservative prudent person test, there are also to be found in the 
legislation significant allusions to the findings of modern financial theory that underlie the Third 
Restatement.  Although these allusions when coupled with the prudent person test may be seen as 
jurisprudentially ambiguous they clearly empower trustees to take advantage of the theoretical 
findings.  These allusions to modern investment theory are to be found in provisions that require 
trustees to have regard to 15 specific matters when investing (ACT s14C; NSW s14C; NT s8; Qld s24; 
SA s9; Tas s8; Vic s8; WA s20; NZ s13E).  They are as follows: 
 
(a) The purposes of the trust and the needs and circumstances of the beneficiaries. 
 
(b) The desirability of diversifying trust investments. 
 
(c) The nature of and risk associated with existing trust investments and other trust property. 
 
(d) The need to maintain the real value of the capital or income of the trust. 
 
(e) The risk of capital or income loss or depreciation. 
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(f) The potential for capital appreciation. 
 
(g) The likely income return and the timing of income return. 
 
(h) The probable duration of the trust. 
 
(i) The liquidity and marketability of the proposed investment during, and on the determination of, 
the term of the proposed investment. 
 
(j) The aggregate value of the trust estate. 
 
(k) The effect of the proposed investment in elation to the tax liability of the trust. 
 
(l) The likelihood of inflation affecting the value of the proposed investment or other trust property. 
 
(m) (except in New Zealand) The costs (including commissions, fees, charges and duties payable) in 
making the proposed investment. 
 
It is within these highly significant provisions that trustees can find justification for pursuing rewarding, 
non-traditional investment strategies, when appropriate to a particular trust. 
 
 
Modern investment theory 
 
One main purpose of this lecture is to consider whether the findings of modern investment theory can 
assist trustees.  A starting point would seem to be to consider two key phrases used by investment 
theorists.  One is the efficient market hypothesis and the other modern portfolio theory.  Do these 
phrases really mean anything? 
 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis evolved in the 1960s from the Ph.D. dissertation of Eugene Fama.  
Fama argued that in an active market that includes many well-informed and intelligent investors, 
securities will be appropriately priced and reflect all available information.  To the extent that a market 
is efficient, no amount of information or analysis can guarantee to the investor returns better than an 
average benchmark.  Associated with the efficient market hypothesis is the random walk theory.  That 
theory asserts that price movements will not follow any patterns or trends and that past price 
movements cannot be used to predict future price movements: Eugene F Fama, "Random Walks in 
Stock Market Prices," Financial Analysts Journal, September/October 1965.  Consumer protection 
laws now require some fund managers to include this proposition in advertisements soliciting 
business.  
The phrase efficient market is usually left undefined in literature about the efficient market hypothesis: 
it is taken for granted.  What it is that makes a market efficient?  It is submitted that indicia of an 
efficient market include the following: 
 
(a) It provides easily accessible venues to vendors and purchasers for the transaction of business. 
(b)  It enables vendors and purchasers to transact business quickly. 
(c) It is capable of handling small as well as large volumes of business. 
(d) It offers price transparency. 
(e) It offers low or at least transparent transaction costs. 
(f) It offers a minimum of intermediacy between vendor and purchaser. 
(g) It offers a minimum requirement of paperwork. 
(h) It is free of transfer taxes. 
 
There may be further indicia.  In applying these indicia one form of property most capable of efficient 
marketing would appear to be commercial choses in action, in particular shares.   Writings that discuss 
the efficient market hypothesis seem to assume that it applies only to such investments as meet all or 
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most of these indicia.  The markets for trading in such forms of property are more accessible than ever 
before; price and transaction costs are transparent and they can handle virtually all the business 
required of them at immense speed, sometimes at the speed of light.  There is a minimum of 
intermediacy and paperwork and no transfer taxes.  These characteristics attract large numbers of 
investors, many of them well informed, to financial markets and must inevitably attract trustees. 
 
Let us probe the efficient market theory further.  Consider what happens when an investor in an 
efficient market – for instance the share market – decides to act: that is, to buy or to sell.  
 
First of all, however expert and informed the investor is, or however foolish and ignorant, it is the 
market that dictates the day’s price, not the investor.  A very large investor’s decision to buy or to sell 
may affect the market price.  But the ordinary investor must accept the day’s price or exit the market. 
 
Secondly, pricing represents the combined judgment of both sellers and buyers; and is sustained by 
volume trading.  However knowledgeable or ignorant, the buyer buys in the hope or belief that now is 
the time to buy.  The seller sells in the belief that now is the time to sell.  Since one cannot appraise 
the judgment of an investor according to the outcome of the investment (Nestlé v National 
Westminster Bank Plc (1988) [1993] 1 WLR 1260 (CA) per Staughton LJ at 1276) one can never say 
that either the investor who buys or the investor who sells, at the price set by the market on the day, 
has made a mistake.  It is suggested that the vocabulary of right and wrong, or smart or foolish, does 
not belong here.  Price in an efficient market is skill neutral. 
 
Thirdly there are forms of price sensitive information that can never be factored in to the market 
analyst’s calculations.  For instance the analyst can never know how many buyers and sellers will 
want to deal on any given day; or whether there are far more buyers than sellers or vice versa.  Nor 
can the analyst know for what reasons, other than reasons based on objective market analysis, an 
investor may decide to buy or to sell.  Many investors enter the market for purely personal reasons.  If 
the efficient market hypothesis includes such imponderables in its ratiocination, it is not a hypothesis 
that can assist trustees who wish to invest.  But that is not its raison d’être.  Its raison d’être is to 
demonstrate that making costly enquiries when investing is not cost effective.  Its value for trustees is 
that they cannot be charged with negligence merely for having bought or sold an investment at a price 
supported by volume trading in an efficient market.  
 
Where a market is inefficient, however, knowledge and skill can make all the difference.  So extensive 
enquiries are justifiable.  As an example of a less efficient market I would suggest the real estate 
market.  Unlike financial investments it is often impossible to compare one piece of realty with another, 
because usually each parcel of realty is unique.  For vendors and purchasers of realty, knowledge of 
such things as future developments in transport infra structure, in environmental and planning policy 
and in demographics will place the skilled investor at an advantage, as will building engineering 
expertise and a knowledge of the law.  Without expertise however, the investor is hampered by 
transparency as to prices which is clouded by a real estate industry the reputability of which has been 
compromised by rogue elements and deterred by such matters as the impact of estate agents’ 
commission, the complexity of the legal system of title transfer, and legal costs and stamp duty. 
 
As another example one might suggest that the art and antiques markets are relatively inefficient.  The 
ability to differentiate between the paintings of a master and those of a master’s school and even 
skilled forgeries is sometimes not available even in the world’s most prestigious auction houses; and 
very few people can identify the provenance of unmarked antique porcelain, pottery or glass.  Those 
who can are at an advantage. 
 
Is our comprehension of the efficient market hypothesis assisted by the expertise of the financial press 
and the advertisements of the finance management industry?  It is worth considering what substance 
there is in some of the phrases that crop up in financial journalism.  One is: “profit takers were out in 
force today”.  Another is: “bargain hunters came into the market today”; another is “financial markets 
welcomed (or failed to respond to) the news” and another is “the market made a technical correction”.   
It is difficult to find any illumination in such phrases.  As for profit takers, that is vendors, one may well 
ask: “who were the purchasers”?  And of bargain hunters, that is purchasers, one may well ask: “who 
were the vendors”?  The financial press, in using these expressions, seems sometimes to be making 
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unjustifiable value judgments.  It seems to be suggesting that the profit takers and the bargain hunters 
are smarter than those they have dealt with.  If this is so the phrases endorse the decisions of the 
vendors in the one case and the purchasers in the other.  Why should they?  And as for news, for 
instance of take-overs or mergers, or management changes affecting prices, all one can say is that it 
is impossible to know whether the news is good or bad, or even what the outcome will be.  
Furthermore, how can one tell that it is that news, and not other factors, that made the difference, or 
no difference?  It is to be doubted whether this has any real meaning.  If the phrase “the market made 
a technical correction” is redolent of a belief in some sort of mystical omniscience of “the market”, it is 
not illuminating.  The efficient market hypothesis endorses this mystique in that it holds that the 
individual cannot “beat the market”. 
 
As for the finance management industry we do know that fund managers accumulate wealth by using 
other people’s money rather than their own.  Other people’s money is their business.  Self-interest 
dictates that fund managers reject the all-inclusive view embraced by the efficient market hypothesis.  
Fund managers necessarily take a narrower, self-determined view.  In doing so the industry utters 
some strange pronouncements.  For example a very large fund manager, in a half page advertisement 
in The Australian newspaper for 23 August 2000, in a series described as Insights for Investors, 
informed the investing public that Mount Kosciusko is not Australia’s highest mountain: Big Ben is.  Big 
Ben, if you read the rest of the long advertisement, is in Heard Island, part of Australia’s Antarctic 
Territories; and a picture of it can be viewed on a web site.  The site reveals that very few people have 
ever seen the summit of Big Ben because it is always shrouded in clouds.  One wonders whether this 
is a metaphor for the fund management industry. 
 
The advertisement having pronounced that Equity markets reveal “truths with ruthless efficiency”- 
doffing its cap to the efficient market hypothesis - goes on to say: “And there’s always the odd market 
truth, as remote and clouded as Big Ben, waiting to be revealed.  Once it is True Value’s assigned, 
and the stock’s marked up or marked down before the average investor can say boo.” One wonders 
whether True Value is an attempt at a Platonic hypostasis or an allusion to a chain of Hardware 
outlets.  It can hardly be the former because True Value, in the share market, itself changes before 
you can say boo.  The advertisement also advises us to note the con in conventional wisdom.  Our 
fund manager has teams of experts “working in a collegiate style that fosters cross pollination and 
encourages critique.” One can commend the advertisement as a masterpiece of persuasion.  But one 
may legitimately ask whether the exercise is cost effective for the investing clients of the fund 
manager. 
 
One should conclude that in the case of efficient markets, the valuable contribution of a portfolio 
manager consists of analysing and investing appropriately, based on the personal profile of the 
investor having regard to such factors such as age, tax bracket, risk aversion, employment pension 
eligibility and so on.  It is in this context that expert financial advice can be crucial.  The role of the 
portfolio manager in an efficient market is to tailor a portfolio to those needs, rather than to beat the 
market. 
 
 
Modern portfolio theory 
 
In essence modern portfolio theory demonstrates the advantages of diversification.  The advantages 
include the minimisation of risk and administrative costs.  Risk is minimised because diversification 
averages profits and losses.  Administrative costs are minimised because the efficient market 
hypothesis demonstrates that trustees cannot obtain better than average returns by making expensive 
enquiries in an attempt to forecast price movements.  Trustees who decide to invest an appropriate 
proportion of the trust fund in a diversified portfolio of, say, shares may be referred to the findings of 
the United States author R A Brearley in his work An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common 
Stocks (2nd ed 1983).  He estimated (at 112) that as few as ten well selected stocks can achieve 87% 
diversification; 20 such stocks, 93%, 50 such 97% and 100 such, 98% (cited in Langbein, The Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing [1996] 81 Iowa LR 641-669).  A portfolio that 
attempts to mirror the market as a whole is called index linked, or an index tracker.  The value of a 
diversified portfolio itself reflects rises and falls in the market it tracks, that is, it cannot avoid systemic 
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variations of value.  But those variations can be flattened by following a policy of holding the portfolio 
and of investing regularly. 
 
Modern portfolio theory is highly persuasive and many fund managers index link.  This is not to say 
that trustees must index link rigidly.  It is not appropriate for trustees to set a policy, in advance, that if 
changes in share prices have the effect that a portfolio in management ceases to reflect the list 
precisely, shares that have fallen in value must be sold, and shares that have risen in value 
purchased, although some fund managers do that.  Such a policy makes the mistaken assumption 
that past price movements are predictors of future movements and can commission driven.  It might 
also have the effect of fettering the future exercise of the trustees’ discretion in investing.  It is 
arguable that modern portfolio theory justifies investors to respond to volatility storms, sometimes 
caused by fraudulent price manipulation, in the same way as to systemic price fluctuations, that is, to 
ride them out. 
 
 
Homes and hedges 
 
The new legislation specifically authorises trustees to purchase residences for beneficiaries.  This is 
not a rejection of diversification theory.  It recognises a particular feature of the Australian tax system 
that confers benefits on homeowners.  A trust estate that consists solely of four residences for four 
beneficiaries could not be described as pursuing a goal of diversification; but it might well be far more 
advantageous to each of the beneficiaries than investment in a diversified portfolio producing only 
taxable income; and it can be justified by the specific power conferred on trustees by the legislation.  
 
As for hedge funds occasionally trustees will be entirely justified in using them for the purpose for 
which they are intended.  For instance a trustee with an obligation to pay a large sum in a nominated 
overseas currency at a future date may well decide to insure the obligation against a fall in value of the 
Australian dollar vis-à-vis the nominated currency.  Out of such context, however, a trustee would be 
justified in investing in a hedge fund only an appropriate fraction of the fund under investment, that is a 
fraction justified by a disciplined diversification policy.  Similar remarks would apply to other 
investment markets such as the futures or derivatives markets. 
 
 
Guidelines for protection against fraud 
 
Trustees of large funds must be constantly on their guard against criminal intrusion.  Sophisticated 
misconduct has not been absent from the Australian financial scene; and trustees of large funds 
should assume that they will be targeted by criminal elements and that legislation designed to protect 
investors is ineffective.  The lack of financial experience of elected trustees and the sense of power 
which control of huge sums of money imparts may make some trustees of large funds vulnerable to 
commit fraud.  There are warning signs.  There are strategies that can deter the criminal.  There follow 
some very elementary, but by no means always followed, prudential safeguards to protect against 
fraud. 
 
Maintenance of separate accounts 
 
A common indication of negligent and dishonest trust management is that the trustee fails to keep 
trust property separate from the trustee’s own property. 
 
Diversification 
 
The advantages of diversification in terms of risk and cost minimisation have been briefly described.  
Except where the purposes of the trust or the needs of the beneficiaries justify the maintenance of an 
under-diversified portfolio, failure to diversify is a first sign of mismanagement.  Serious criminals will 
not attempt to suborn trustees of a $100m pension fund who, in pursuance of a disciplined policy of 
diversification, usually do not acquire any investment costing more than $500,000.  The prize would 
not be large enough. 
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Investing in efficient markets 
 
The advantages of investing in an efficient market have been described. 
 
Selling to buy 
 
Decisions to buy are governed by principles very different from decisions to sell.  In the case of a 
pension fund trust where contributions are being received regularly the trustees must adopt an 
investment strategy that will ensure immediate short-term investment of contributions.  This can be 
achieved by placing contributions in interest-bearing deposit accounts at a bank.  In the case of more 
sophisticated longer term investing, trustees who cannot achieve a high level of diversification must 
ensure that they obtain proper advice in investing. 
 
Selling an investment requires justification.  For instance if an investment consists of an older building 
a decision to sell or renovate may have to be made.  Making that decision will involve a consideration 
not only of the profitability implications of the decision but also of the availability of other investments, 
the balance of the portfolio, any need for liquidity and so on.  Another reason for selling might be that 
there is a purchaser willing to pay what is clearly an above market price, for instance a purchaser 
whose ownership of adjacent property gives access to development potential not accessible to the 
trustees or anyone else.  Another reason for selling is that the purposes of the trust and the needs and 
circumstances of the beneficiaries require it.  Selling in a difficult market to meet a liquidity need 
should rarely be necessary for trustees of large funds because they should anticipate the need and 
have sufficient investments in an easily realisable form. 
 
What, it is submitted, may be unjustifiable, is for trustees to sell an investment solely for the purpose of 
purchasing some other investment.  It stands to reason that if asset A is sold for $X for the purpose of 
acquiring asset B and the $X is then used to acquire asset B, the value of the trust fund has not 
changed  - asset B is worth the same as asset A.  The trustees may well believe that asset A will fall in 
value and asset B will rise in value; but it is unlikely that that belief is shared by the purchaser of asset 
A or the vendor of asset B.  Trustees cannot assume that their belief is always right.  In any case the 
costs of the sale and purchase have been irretrievably lost.   A practice of swapping investments, 
marketed as good practice by some managing entities, is often commission-driven.  Known as 
“churning" in the United States and Canada, it is incompatible with efficient fiduciary management.   
 
Completing transactions 
 
When trustees agree to acquire an investment, they must not part with the purchase moneys without 
at the same time receiving the title, or the means of acquiring the title, to the property purchased.  
When they sell trust property they must not part with the title deeds and transfer documents without at 
the same time receiving the purchase moneys. 
 
Documentation 
 
The reliability and the genuineness of documentation supporting an investment proposal should 
always be carefully checked and, if in doubt, professional and independent advice obtained.  For 
example, according to a press report on page 38 of The Australian newspaper dated 12 July 2000, a 
$100 million dollar loan fraud was successfully perpetrated against three major banks during the year 
2000.  The loans were supposedly secured by the sale of a non-existent cargo of prawns, to be 
transported from Brisbane to Japan on a non-existent ship.  Several vital documents produced to 
secure the loans were forged.  These included falsified supplier invoices, invalid bills of lading, bogus 
purchaser invoices, discrepancies in letters of credit making them invalid and phoney export insurance 
policies.  Some of the forgeries were obvious.  The perpetrator of the fraud was said to be bankrupt 
and the liquidator was reported as having failed to trace any of the moneys lent.  One must not make 
inferences from a mere press report.  But it certainly underlines the duty of trustees, at any rate, to 
check documentation when trading.  And that they, indeed no-one, should not assume that large 
financial institutions are immune from infiltration by organised crime, which has great expertise in the 
suppression of evidence.  Another question which arises is whether, where the negligent conduct of 
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the officers of a financial institution adversely affects the pockets of its shareholders or investors, an 
action in negligence can be brought against those officers. 
 
It is elementary safeguards such as these that are routinely ignored by negligent or fraudulent 
trustees, such as those of the Mirror newspaper pension fund, dominated by the late Robert Maxwell. 
 
 
Financial advisers and fund managers 
 
There is no doubt that trustees may employ financial advisers to assist them in investing.  Indeed the 
new legislation specifically authorises them to do so.  If one considers how trustees should approach a 
financial adviser many thoughts come to mind.  The trustees would indicate to the adviser that they 
are trustees, what the extent of the fund is, what its purposes are and the needs and circumstances of 
the beneficiaries.  They could hardly do less.  The financial adviser would then be circumscribed by 
the trustees’ duties because the trustees are not investing on their own account.  The trustees should 
also indicate to the adviser those matters which trustee legislation requires them to take into 
consideration; and if appropriate invite the adviser to maintain the relationship prescribed as an 
ongoing responsibility, and to advise the trustees should circumstances require reconsideration of 
policy or investment.  It is not a far step from that to allow the adviser to take over the actual 
management of the trust assets or part of them. 
 
 
A comparative perspective 
 
The law of Quebec, a jurisdiction which has experience in both common and civil law concepts, 
provides illumination in our attempt to clarify the relationship which the law should allow trustees to 
enter into with financial experts.  In the recent case of Placements Armand Laflamme Inc. v 
Prudential-Bache Commodities Canada Ltd (2000) SCC 26 (Supreme Court of Canada 3 May 2000) 
Armand Laflamme, a person with little or no knowledge of financial affairs, entrusted a fund to the 
management of Roy, a securities broker.  The broker indulged in risky adventures, ignored the needs 
and circumstances of the beneficiaries, as well as certain instructions of his client and lost the fund.  
The Supreme Court of Canada described the nature and scope of the Quebec institution of the 
fiduciary mandate. 
 
“23  A securities dealer may perform a variety of functions.  First, in his most common role, 
the dealer is an intermediary.  He buys and sells securities on behalf of his client, in 
accordance with the client’s instructions.  The dealer is in no way involved in the 
management of his client’s portfolio and has no discretion regarding its content and the 
transactions to be carried out.  In this situation, the client’s account is sometimes referred 
to as ‘non-discretionary’. 
 
24  Second, a dealer may also be responsible for managing the portfolio.  In addition to his 
function as a dealer, he is also a portfolio manager with responsibility for making decisions 
with respect to the management and make up of the portfolio.  This kind of account is 
referred to as a ‘discretionary account’.  While in the case at the bar Roy was both dealer 
and manager, these functions may sometimes be performed by different persons… 
 
25  The functions of a manager and the powers granted to the manager may be quite 
extensive.  Lise Beaudoin, (Le contrat de gestion de portefeuille de valeurs mobilières 
(1994) describes them as follows at pp.25-26: 
 
‘Authorised management of a portfolio results from delegation by the client of 
his decision-making authority.  The task covers the intellectual, tactical and 
strategic activities performed in respect of a portfolio.  The manager acts in 
accordance with the investments objectives set with the client.  His decisions 
are essentially guided by the concept of maximising return on the portfolio, 
having regard to the risks that this involves.  The manager determines the 
portfolio’s make up and the investments to make…’ 
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26  Thus the manager makes most of the decisions relating to the portfolio and the make 
up of the portfolio.  The scope of his management authority and the exercise of his 
discretion will, however, depend on any restrictions that are imposed by law or agreement.  
In particular, the agreement may expressly circumscribe the manager’s authority and 
discretion, for instance by giving the client the option of confirming certain transactions.  
Such limitations may also be implicit in the client’s investment objectives or 
circumstances… 
 
28  As in the case of any mandate, the mandate between a manager and his client is 
imbued with the concept of trust, since the client places trust in the manager - the 
mandatory - to manage his affairs… This element of trust explains, for instance the 
mandator’s authority to revoke the mandate at any time (art. 1756 Civil Code of Lower 
Canada; art 2176 Civil Code of Quebec).  This spirit of trust is reflected in the weight of the 
obligations that rest on the manager, which will be heavier where the mandator is 
vulnerable, lacks a specialised knowledge, is dependent on the mandatory, and where the 
mandate is important.  The corresponding requirements of fair dealing, good faith and 
diligence on the part of the manager in relation to his client will thus be more stringent.” 
 
These remarks might well be regarded as pertinent to trustees who employ a financial adviser; but 
they are also pertinent to a person contracting with a trustee in the creation of an inter vivos trust.  
Increasingly the relationship between the settlor and the trustees arises in the context a legal contract.  
In that case it is the contract that governs the relationship.  It is unwise, particularly in Australia, to 
assume that financial advisers undertake fiduciary duties except within the context of an enforceable 
relationship.  This is because whereas the Canadian perception of fiduciary allows the courts 
sometimes to impose prescriptive duties on fiduciaries in Australia the courts limit themselves to the 
imposition of proscriptive duties:  Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 per Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 
113; National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Limited v Citibank Savings Limited (1998) 
(unrep) FCA No NG 765 of 1994 (Lindgren J).  
 
So in employing financial advisers to advise them or fund managers to invest for them trustees must 
take great care in framing the terms of the contract between them. 
 
Where trustees employ financial advisers, it is for the trustees to decide what action to take having 
considered the advice received.  Investments undertaken following advice will be made in the names 
of the trustees. 
 
But where trustees consider employing a fund manager to invest trust funds in the fund manager’s 
name, leaving the trustees with only a contract binding them to the manager, different considerations 
arise.  In particular there arises the question of whether the trustees may be seen as delegating to the 
fund manager decisions that only the trustees may take. 
 
 
Delegation and agency 
 
The law has failed to make a clear distinction between matters that trustees may not delegate and 
matters for which they may employ agents. 
 
It is arguable that the no delegation rule has been assumed to be much broader than it should be and 
that is has imposed an unjustifiable fetter on the law that has always given trustees a wide general 
power to employ agents.  Professor John Langbein has described the rule as “murky” and “overbroad” 
in The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing [1996] 81 Iowa LR at 650-651.  
It is time for the courts to give consideration to the boundary between the restrictive rule preventing 
delegation and the broad power to employ agents. 
 
There are, of course provisions in trustee legislation to enable a delegate to attend meetings where a 
trustee cannot, viz: ACT s 64; NSW s 64; NT s 3; Qld s 56; SA s 17; Tas s 25AA; Vic s 30 and 
Instruments (Powers of Attorney) Act No 9421 (1980) ss.2, 5; WA s 54; NZ s 31.  In England in 
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particular changes to trustee legislation since 1925 have brought confusion to this distinction.  Aside 
from these provisions it is submitted that the only decisions of trustees that cannot be delegated, or 
entrusted to agents, are decisions that relate to the conduct of the trust as such.  As an obvious 
starting place it is clear, for example, that only the trustees can decide upon the time and place of 
meetings of trustees or what items should be placed on the agenda for such a meeting.  Until recently 
no general guidance has been furnished by case law as to what are matters concerning the conduct of 
the trust as such.  Surprisingly, however, it is submitted that the new investment legislation gives that 
guidance, in requiring trustees, when investing, to have regard to certain matters listed in the statute.  
Most if not all of these matters undoubtedly appertain to the conduct of the trust as such.  At the top of 
the list are the purposes of the trust and the needs and circumstances of the beneficiaries; and the 
desirability of diversifying trust investments.  In any case, apart from the question of whether these 
matters appertain to the conduct of the trust as such, agents cannot be employed to “have regard” to 
these matters because the statute requires the trustees to do that.  Trustees may need to employ 
advisers to advise them with respect to these matters in which case their duty is to consider that 
advise when having regard to the matters.  They cannot leave it to their advisers or follow their advice 
blindly. 
 
On the other hand, if it is prudent for investors to use the services of fund managers, it is arguable that 
trustees should not be excluded from acting prudently by a doubtful doctrine of the law of trusts dating 
from long before the recent revelations of financial theory: see Restatement of Trusts Third s 227, 
comment j.  In Jones v AMP Perpetual Trustee Co NZ Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 690 trustees invested in a 
life insurance policy the premiums of which were invested in a unit style trust fund that fell in value.  
The Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the trustee had improperly delegated its investment 
power, because investment in insurance policies was specifically authorised by the trust instrument 
saying at 705: 
 
“Express authorisation of this kind means that Perpetual was doing what it was entitled to 
do, and that cannot be an improper delegation of authority.” 
 
After quoting these words Professor Philip Manns in New Zealand Trustee Investing: Reflecting on 
Modern Portfolio Practice and the Ancient Distinction of Capital and Income  (1998) Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 611 observes at 625: 
 
“Further, the court reiterated its conclusions when the trustee’s actions were measured 
against the “prudent person” rule of s 13B; consequently a decision to invest in managed 
funds is not a wrongful delegation under either pre-1988 law or the post 1988 prudent 
person law.” 
 
In addition it may be argued that by authorising trustees to invest in “any form of investment”, 
investment in the “products” of fund managers are within the meaning of the legislation; and that it is 
unduly restrictive to deny trustees access to the very expertise, in fund managers, the availability of 
which has generated law reform. 
 
It is submitted that the problem is not that trustees may not invest in products offered by fund 
managers but that it may be difficult for them to find products that are suitable to the purposes of the 
particular trust and the needs and circumstances of the particular beneficiaries.  Not all fund 
managers’ products are appropriate as vehicles for the investment of trust funds.  Some products 
appeal to the owner investor rather than to trustees.  A product that requires commitment by the 
investor to a long-term contract and to reinvestment of income for the duration of the contract   may be 
unsuitable for a trustee who has a duty to distribute the income or capital of the trust on a regular 
basis, or who has a power, often found these days, to terminate the trust.  A product that does not 
offer transparency to the investor with respect to such matters as the realisable capital value of the 
product from time to time or its annual realisable income return may also be more suitable for the 
owner investor than the trustee.  Furthermore it is submitted, for reasons already given, that a trustee 
cannot impose fiduciary duties with respect to the conduct of the trust as such upon a manager, even 
if a manager could be persuaded to assume them.  Efficiencies of scale require fund managers to 
offer a generalised product to a great number of owner investors, rather than a product tailored to the 
needs of a trust.   
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On the other hand, there is one type of trust that does have a long temporal reach and requires the 
reinvestment of income, namely the superannuation trust fund.  Trustees of such funds may find 
products of fund managers suitable for their needs, subject to the juggernaut of Australian 
superannuation fund legislation. 
 
But other concerns must deter the trustee minded to invest trust funds with commercial fund 
managers.  Clearly fund managers are in business to make money for themselves.  To a certain 
extent this purpose places them in conflict with their clients.  Fund managers must engage in risk 
taking activities if they are to secure better than average returns to their clients having remunerated 
themselves appropriately and met all their administrative expenses.  Administration expenses can 
themselves be enormous.  For instance the Bankers Trust website, in a report in 1998 indicated that 
updating its computer systems for the new millennium would cost as much as $260m.  Advertising 
expenses that managers must assume to keep their products in the public eye can also be very 
considerable.  Whilst such considerations may be insignificant to trustees of very large funds minded 
to acquire fund managers’ products, they may be a deterrent to trustees of small funds. 
 
 
The current state of the law of trusts 
 
(1) Liability for negligence 
 
In some ways the new  investment powers, while freeing trustees of the tyranny of the old list of 
authorised trustee investments, places a greater burden upon them.  They are now obliged to take 
responsibility themselves for their conduct in investing.  It is not surprising in this context that trustees 
nowadays ordinarily expect to be indemnified from loss caused by negligence, and that the Courts 
have expressed willingness to give full effect to indemnifying provisions in trust instruments and 
contracts: Armitage v Nurse [1997] 3 WLR 1046.  This development in the law substantially diminished 
the reliance that can be placed on the trust as a property management device.  
 
(2) Trustees’ remuneration 
 
In the last fifty years trusteeship has become highly remunerated.  Trustees no longer act gratuitously 
or for very low fees, as family solicitors used to.  The level of remuneration to which trustees are 
entitled may eventually be seen as a deterrent to the creation of small trusts.  In New South Wales the 
Trustee Companies Regulation 2000 came into effect on the 1st September 2000.  It details the 
services for which management fees may be charged by trustee companies.  But the law must be the 
same for other trustees.  It is an exhaustive list and includes such matters as keeping books of 
accounts, forming and restructuring companies, and carrying on a business as well as attending to the 
usual duties of managing trust property. 
 
Sometimes one may find oneself asking whether a particular trustee is managing a fund not for the 
purposes of the trust or the needs and circumstances of the beneficiaries, but for the purpose of 
earning more remuneration.  It is not unheard of that the entire income of the trust has been absorbed 
in some years in trustees’ fees and management expenses, a justification being that the trustees were 
benefiting the capital of the fund by their expertise in investing.  This cannot be tolerated.  In the first 
place the trustees were ignoring the main purpose of the trust, which was to secure a reasonable 
income for the life tenant.  Secondly in appropriating remuneration and management expenses from 
the income account they were in further breach of trust because remuneration for activities directed to 
improving the capital of the fund should have been charged to capital.  Thirdly, if indeed the value of 
the capital account had risen as a result of the trustees’ efforts, a portion of the capital should have 
been set aside to meet the needs of the income beneficiary.  If their efforts had not resulted in benefit 
to the capital account, they might properly be required to repay remuneration appropriated from the 
fund on the grounds that it had not been properly earned.  
 
Similar concerns about levels of trustees’ remuneration and disbursements may also be expressed in 
relation to the management of some charitable trusts.  The Industries Commission Report on 
Charitable Organisations (September 1995) revealed that some high profile Australian charities 
admitted that administration expenses absorbed over 48% of their income.  The problem seems to be 
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insoluble.  Concern is justifiable where the purpose of the charity is the relief of poverty; but the 
officers and employees of the charity enjoy large commission style remuneration and substantial 
expense accounts.  Members of the public are often unaware of this; and their immense generosity to 
these charities could be at risk, which would be a national disaster.  The States and the 
Commonwealth, which makes a huge contribution to these charities through tax exemptions, should 
address this issue.  In particular, all charities that enjoy any form of taxation relief should be required 
to make all their accounts available to the Attorney-General who should be empowered to publish 
them on the Internet.  
 
(3) Trustees’ discretions 
 
The vast majority of trust funds these days give important discretions to trustees.  They are justifiable 
mainly because they provide flexibility to respond to a tax system that changes unpredictably from 
year to year; and because they can offer some protection to beneficiaries who become bankrupt.  The 
trouble is that some trustees may believe that the discretions conferred upon them relieve them of 
accountability for their actions.  It is essential that they realise that their discretions must be exercised 
solely to further the purposes of the trust and to meet the needs of the beneficiaries.  When the trust 
instrument gives clear indications of the purposes of the trust the trustees must exercise any 
discretions conferred on them for those purposes.  A trustee’s discretion is never unfettered.  For 
example, where a charitable trust is created by the will of a person who, during his or her lifetime, 
used to make regular and substantial gifts to certain favoured charitable purposes and who, while 
conferring a broad discretion on the trustees to distribute a trust fund for charitable purposes, 
nevertheless chooses to refer to the favoured charities in the will, the trustees should regard their 
discretions as exercisable within the context of the testator’s habits of giving during his or her lifetime.  
They should depart from the testator’s habits of giving to the named charities only if there is good 
reason to, and not in pursuance of a prejudiced or capricious exercise of a supposedly unlimited 
discretion.  It should not be open for them to say that since the trust confers a general discretion upon 
them it is only they who have the power to decide all questions of distribution of funds.  That might be 
more arguable in the case of a protective trust for an incapacitated person, but it is not arguable where 
the objects of benefit are responsible entities.  The courts are increasingly insisting that trustees 
exercise discretions in accordance with the purposes of the trust and court intervention is to be 
encouraged where they fail to do that. 
 
The law of trusts has changed enormously in the last fifty years.  The high cost of managing a trust 
fund, and ensuring that trustees perform their duties, means that in some ways it is less able to deal 
with what is required of it.  Nevertheless if the law can continue to ensure accountability in trustees, 
the institution will remain a significant achievement of our jurisprudence.  
Program on Nonprofit Corporations           Working Paper No.PONC96 16  
Bibliography 
 
Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law (1976) (No 1) American Bar Foundation 
Research Journal; R A Brearley, An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks (2nd ed 
1983); C P Kindelberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (Allen & Unwin 1984) pp.186-7; Bevis 
Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule (1986); WA Lee, The 
Investment of Pension Funds in Finn (ed), Equity and Commercial Relationships (1986), Ch 11; 
Jeffrey N Gordon; The Puzzling Survival of the constrained Prudent Man Rule (1987) 62 NUYLR 52-
114; Paul G. Haskell: The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory 
(1990) 69 North Carolina Law Rev 87; Edward C Halbach, Trust Investment Law in the Third 
Restatement [1992] 77 Iowa LR 1151-1185; Luxton: Ethical Investments in Hard Times (1992) 55 
MLR 587; John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 Mo. L. 
Rev. 105, 108-09 (1994); W A Lee Industry Superannuation in Australia: Politics and Structure in 
Cope (ed) Equity Issues and Trends (1995); J D Stanford, An Economic Analysis of the Legal Concept 
of Authorised Trustee Status in (Law & Economics Conference Lincoln University, Canterbury, August 
1995); Stephen M. Penner, Note, International Investment and the Prudent Investor Rule: The 
Trustee’s Duty to Consider International Investment Vehicles, 16 Mich J. Int’l L. 601, 623-24 (1995); 
Andrew S Butler: Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Powers of Trustees: the New Zealand 
Experience (1995) 7 Bond Law Review 119; Sages: The Prudent Investor Rule and the Duty not to 
Delegate May 1995 Trusts and Estates 22 - 31; Dale & Gwimmell: Charity Investment and Modern 
Portfolio Theory (1995-6) 3 Charity Law & Practice; John H Langbein: The Uniform Prudent Investor 
Act and the Future of Trust Investing [1996] 81 Iowa LR 641-669; Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead: 
Trustees and their broader community: Where Duty, Morality and Ethics Converge (91996) 70 ALJ 
2005;  G E Dal Pont: Conflicting Signals for the Trustees’ Duty to Invest (1996) 24 Australian Business 
Law 101;  W A Lee Trustee Law and Superannuation Law: the Interface: New Zealand Business Law 
Quarterly (1997) 116; Davis and Shaw: Trustee Investment The Prudent Person Approach (1997, 
Butterworths); M Milner: Pension Trusts: A New Trust Form (1997) 61 Conv 97; W. Brantly Phillips, 
Jr., Note, Chasing Down The Devil: Standards of Prudent Investment Under the Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 335, 352 (1997); John H Langbein: The Secret Life of the Trust The 
Trust as an Instrument of Commerce (1997) 107 Yale LJ 165; F P Manns: New Zealand Trustee 
Investing: Reflecting on Modern Portfolio Practice and the Ancient Distinction of Capital and Income 
(1998) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review  611-628; Watt & Staunch: Is there Liability for 
Imprudent Trustee Investment? [1998] Conv 352; McCormack, Sexy but not Sleazy: Trustees 
Investments and Ethical Considerations (1998) 19 Company Lawyer 39; Martin D. Begleiter: Does the 
Prudent Investor Need the Uniform Prudent Investor Act - An Empirical Study of Trust Investment 
Practices (1999) 51 Maine. L. Rev. 27; Paul U Ali: Riskless Trading: Passport Options. Fund 
Managers and the Prudent Investor Rule (2000) 18 Company and Securities Law Jo 209; D. 
Mackenzie: Fear in the Markets – how finance theory becomes part of what it examines (2000) 
London Review of Books Vol 22 Number 13, pp 31-32. 
